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Recent Developments in Relations 
between the EC and Eastern Europe.*
1. Introduction
In June 1988 a declaration was signed between the EC 
and CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) (1) 
which announced the opening of official relations 
between the two blocs, and their intention to cooperate 
in areas falling within their competences and of mutual 
interest. The process leading to this recognition had 
taken over 25 years and had been characterised by a 
series of fits and starts. Just how much ground has been 
covered is evident if the Soviet descriptions of the EC 
in the late 1950's as the "economic arm of NATO” and "an 
organ of West European monopoly capitalism doomed to 
inevitable destruction because of its internal 
contradictions" (2) are borne in mind.
As there is already a substantial literature (3) the 
history of the evolution of relations between the two 
blocs here will be very brief. First however mention 
must be made of the characteristics and competences of 
the CMEA as this has important bearing on the EC 
attitude towards the CMEA.
2.The CMEA
The CMEA was founded in 1949, mainly as a political 
response to the Marshall plan, but only really became 
active after the signing of the Treaty of Rome 
establishing the EC in 1957. In 1962 Krushchev proposed 
the establishment of a central planning authority and 
the endowment of the CMEA with certain supranational 
powers, but this was contested by several of the smaller 
East European countries, and especially Romania, who 
feared the reduced national independence implied by the 
measures. In 1971 the Programme for Further
Intensification and Improvement of Cooperation and the 
Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the 
CMEA countries was introduced. This set out the 
guidelines for the integration of the CMEA countries 
over the following two decades, but in the event only 
some coordination was achieved, and not the extent of 




























































































The introduction of the 1971 Programme coincided with 
the ending of the transitional period for establishing 
the EC. This suggests a frequently-voiced (Lysdn (1987), 
Matejka (1988)) conclusion, namely that integration in 
the East is often a response or reaction to initiatives 
to speed up the integration process in Western Europe.
However, as an extensive literature discusses (4), 
integration in East and West are very different 
processes. In the context of the CMEA, integration is 
chiefly concerned with state functions, and in 
particular the coordination of central planning and the 
setting up of certain common projects and joint 
ventures, whereas in the West many of the integration 
initiatives are directed towards the market.
A further difference lies in the extent to which 
integration has been achieved in East and West Europe. 
The EC, with its Common Commercial Policy, Common 
Agricultural Policy, Single European Act and power to 
issue Regulations which are directly applicable in 
member states (in the sense that they do not need to be 
transformed into national laws) has a number of 
supranational characteristics. In contrast, in Lysdn's 
words (1987, p.85), the CMEA is "a quite traditional 
organisation" as there has been no transfer of 
sovereignty from its member states. As the 1971 
Comprehensive Programme states (Ch.1,Section 1, 
Paragraph 1),
"Socialist economic integration is conducted on a 
purely voluntary basis, is not accompanied by the 
creation of any supranational organisations and does not 
affect internal planning problems or the financial and 
accounting activities of organisations."
According to Article IV of the CMEA Charter:
"All recommendations and decisions of the Council 
shall be adopted only with the consent of the interested 
member countries of the Council, each country having the 
right to declare its interest in any question considered 
in the Council."
This implies that any international agreement signed 
by the CMEA is not automatically binding on CMEA member 
states, and cannot be imposed on them by the CMEA. In 
effect the competence to conclude and implement such 
agreements rests with the CMEA member states. As Cutler 
points out (1988, p.266), the possibility that member 





























































































"In the light of international law, the CMEA appears 
to be seeking the benefit of all the rights that flow 
from being an international organisation (and an actor 
in the international community) without the obligation 
to fulfil any of the concommitant duties...”
This would seem to confirm Pinder's view (1986, 
pp.11-12) that in its functions and membership the CMEA 
is far more like the OECD ( Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) than the EC.
Further differences between the CMEA and the EC arise 
with regard to their respective memberships. The CMEA 
includes three non-European countries (Cuba, Mongolia, 
and Vietnam) which could have implications for 
cooperation between the two blocs. In addition there is 
the obvious difference that one superpower, the USSR, is 
a member of one of the blocs, while the other, the US is 
not, which has influenced the way in which relations 
between the two blocs have developed.
3. Historical Background:
Relations between the Two Blocs up until 1988
The literature generally divides the process leading 
to mutual recognition of the two blocs into three 
periods. The first lasted until about 1972, and is
characterised by CMEA hostility towards the EC and a 
belief that it was a temporary phenomenon inevitably 
doomed to failure because of its internal capitalistic 
contradictions so that the best policy was simply to 
ignore its existence. The ideological justification for 
this attitude was presented in the 17 theses on the
Common Market, published in the journal "Communist" in 
1957. Anti-EC propaganda was rife, and far from 
recognising the Community, the CMEA countries declared 
their non-recognition and attempted to block EC
participation in international organisations and 
conventions. The first declarations of this type were 
made by the Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland in the
context of the 1968 International Sugar Agreement (5). 
In 1963 the Soviet Foreign Minister even refused to 
accept an EC Document given to him by the Dutch 
Ambassador in Moscow (6) Occasionally, as in 1962 with 
the 32 theses on imperialist integration in Western 
Europe and Krushchev's speech on 'vital questions of the 
development of the world socialist system', there was a 
dawning of awareness that the EC seemed capable of 
surviving as an economic and political reality, though 
probably the main purpose of these speeches was to 




























































































The second phase in the evolution of EC-CMEA 
relations dates from Breznev's 1972 speech which not 
only recognised the reality of the Common Market but 
also opened the way for official contacts between EC and 
CMEA officials from the summer of 1973. During this 
phase there were repeated contacts and initiatives to 
establish relations between the two blocs, all of which 
met with failure because of set positions on each side. 
Negotiations were eventually broken off by mutual 
consent in 1980, which marks the end of this phase.
In part this more open CMEA attitude towards the EC 
from 1972 can be interpreted as part of a wider 
improvement in East-West relations with the era of 
détente, and the preparations for the first CSCE 
(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). On 
the economic side it became impossible to ignore that EC 
policies and especially the Common Agricultural Policy 
were not only taking effect but were also having 
repercussions on East European countries. Attacks 
continued to be made on the EC but it was evident that 
some working arrangement would have to be found. In 
addition the way in which the CMEA proposed to establish 
links with the Community suggests that this was regarded 
as a means of strengthening the internal cohesion and 
integration process of the Eastern bloc.
The CMEA position emerged clearly in 1976 when it 
proposed a framework agreement between the CMEA and its 
member states and the EC and its member states. This 
involvement of CMEA member states was a means of getting 
around the problem of CMEA competences in the matter of 
international treaties. In the proposed agreement the 
principles regulating trade between the two blocs were 
set out, including the insertion of a Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) clause, the aim to reduce obstacles to 
trade and the granting of trade preferences, and in this 
way it was hoped that only minor, "particular concrete 
questions" would be left to bilateral agreements 
involving the EC and CMEA member states. The framework 
agreement proposed by the CMEA also included clauses 
relating to economic, scientific and technological 
cooperation.
Right from these early initiatives the CMEA insisted 
that its relations with the EC should be on a bloc-to- 
bloc basis and dealings directly between the EC and 
individual East European countries were to be of 
secondary importance. This aim can be explained by the 
dominant position of the Soviet Union within the CMEA 
and, as Marsh (1978, p.63) describes, the Soviet desire 
to maintain:




























































































EEC recognition of the CMEA as an equal negotiating body 
and improving the bargaining position of the Communist 
states against the industrially more powerful EEC 
states."
The CMEA proposal was unacceptable to the EC as was 
evident from the Community's counter-draft for an 
agreement later in 1976. The EC wanted relations between 
the two blocs to be restricted to general areas such as 
the exchange of economic information, transport and 
environmental questions. According to the EC, its member 
states could not be party to a framework agreement along 
the lines proposed by the CMEA because this runs counter 
to Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. Instead the 
Community wanted to give priority to bilateral trade 
agreements with individual East European States 
following the transfer of authority for trade matters to 
Brussels from January 1975.
The EC explained its reluctance to a further-reaching 
framework agreement with the CMEA in terms of the 
different nature of the two organisations. The EC 
stressed the intergovernmental rather than supranational 
character of the CMEA pointing out that, unlike the EC, 
the CMEA neither had the power to pursue a common 
commercial policy nor the legal authority to impose 
implementation of an agreement on its members.(8)
The EC maintained that direct links with the smaller 
East European countries were preferable in order to take 
into account the specific characteristics of each 
country (its level of indebtedness, whether or not it is 
a member of GATT, the extent of economic reform 
implemented, and so on). The Community also feared that 
bloc-to-bloc dealings would imply Soviet involvement in 
its relations with the smaller East European countries 
and would strengthen the bonds between the Soviet Union 
and its neighbours.
However the EC position must be regarded to some 
extent as a pretext since, as Sheila Chapman (1985, 
p.429) points out:
"...it is precisely the Commission's refusal to 
negotiate which could force the latter to act in order 
to obtain powers similar to those of the European 
Community. This would inevitably lead to the 
strengthening of the Soviet position within the Eastern 
bloc which is exactly what the Commission claims not to 
want."
As Peter Marsh (1978 p.56) argues, a plausible 
explanation of the Community's behaviour is that 




























































































"...might assist in the creation of a countervailing 
power in the East capable of thwarting its own economic 
and political strategies in that area."
Even during this second phase of relations between 
the two blocs, not only was mutual recognition not 
reached, but Soviet and East European declarations of 
non-recognition of the EC continued. In 1974 the Soviet 
Union succeeded in blocking EC accession to the 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment 
in the Baltic Sea Area. Again, as Cutler (1987, p.265) 
reports, during the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development) negotiations on the Common Fund 
for commodities, the Soviet Union resisted EC membership 
of Common Fund, though ultimately the EC was allowed to 
contribute capital, but not to vote on decisions the 
Fund might take.
As Lysdn describes (1987, p.103), by the 1980's East 
European attitudes to the EC were mellowing. In the 1982 
Protocol to allow EC access to the Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of Living Resources in the Baltic Sea 
and the Belts only the Soviet Union had doubts, and 
these were overcome when the member states threatened to 
withdraw. In 1985 there was no opposition to EC 
participation in the Convention on the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer.
In the absence of recognition up until 1988, various 
ad hoc arrangements emerged (as will be discussed in 
more detail below). After the tranfer of authority for 
trade matters to the EC level from 1975 the East 
European countries and EC member states continued their 
bilateral relations by transforming their previous trade 
agreements into cooperation agreements. Although 
official CMEA trade policy was against bilateral 
agreements with the Community (Cutler (1987), p.263), 
individual East European countries did sign a number of 
sectoral agreements with the EC for sectors which were 
particularly sensitive for the Eastern partner. These 
did however imply a certain de facto recognition as 
Lysdn (1987, p.96) argues:
"...it must be illogical not to consider the fact of 
entering into contractual relations with a non- 
recognised organisation - giving rise to rights and 
obligations between the parties - to amount to an 
implied recognition of that organisation's international 
legal personality and powers pertaining to the 
agreement..."
Furthermore, as John Maslen (1983 p.334) observed, 




























































































”... as active and frequent dealings with the 
Community institutions through their bilateral embassies 
in Brussels as do many countries which have missions 
accredited to the EC."
Though it is difficult to put a precise date, the 
third phase of relations between the two blocs dates 
from roughly 1983 and is characterised by a more open, 
pragmatic CMEA attitude towards the EC. From 1983 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia began discussions with the 
Community aimed at extending their trade links beyond 
existing sectoral agreements, and there were indications 
from the CMEA that it wanted to resume the dialogue 
abandoned in 1980. In June 1983 a communiqué at the CMEA 
summit meeting in Moscow announced the willingness of 
CMEA members to sign an "appropriate" agreement between 
the CMEA and EC in order to develop the economic and 
trade relations already existing between members of the 
two blocs. During a visit of the then EC President, 
Craxi, to Moscow in May 1985, Gorbachev announced that 
it was time to initiate relations with the EC, and to 
search for a "common language" insofar as the EC 
countries act as a "political entity" (9). Later in 1985 
the Secretary of the CMEA sent a letter to the President 
of the Commission proposing the negotiation of a 
document of a general nature between the two blocs, such 
as a mutual declaration of official recognition. The 
CMEA had gone a long way towards meeting the EC 
objections to the 1976 framework agreement.
A delay then occured as the Community wished to 
establish the principle of the "parallel approach", by 
which bilateral relations between the EC and CMEA member 
states could be developed simultaneously with relations 
between the two blocs. This was accepted by the CMEA in 
1986.
A further stalemate then arose over the geographical 
application of the Joint Declaration. All EC agreements 
with third countries contain a territorial clause 
establishing that the agreement holds for all 
territories in which Treaty of Rome is applied. The 
Treaty contains special provisions for West Berlin, so 
that including a territorial clause in an agreement 
implies that West Berlin forms part of the Community. 
This creates problems for East European countries, and 
for example Soviet refusal to accept a territorial 
clause meant that the fisheries agreement negotiated in 
1977 was never concluded. Although territorial clauses 
had been included in certain sectoral agreements, the 
CMEA at first maintained that this would not be possible 
in the case of the Joint Declaration because of its 
general rather than specific nature and because no time 




























































































evident that the Community was not prepared to give way 
on this point the CMEA accepted the "Hungarian Formula" 
used for the earlier sectoral agreements. This entailed 
including a territorial clause in the agreement without 
specifically mentioning West Berlin by name, and then 
proceeding to an exchange of letters between the 
parties, with the CMEA re-asserting the validity of the 
Four-Power Agreement, and the Community ackowledging 
receipt of the letter.
4. The Reasons for the Change in CMEA Attitude
In general CMEA attitudes to foreign policy are 
similar, if not indistinguishable, from those of the 
Soviet Union. Why then did the Soviet Union abandon its 
long-standing insistence on bloc-to-bloc relations and 
accept the EC view that there should be bilateral 
dealings between the Community and individual East 
European states?
Whereas for the smaller East European states the 
interest in having closer links with the Community is 
predominantly economic, for the Soviet Union economic, 
political and strategic motives are interlinked. For a 
long time the economic interest was not sufficiently 
strong to overcome the Soviet Union's political and 
ideological objections to recognition of the EC. Now 
however economic factors are given higher priority, and 
there is a new pragmatism on the part of the Soviet 
Union which, as Matejka (1988, p.15) explains, is 
reflected in:
"...the decision of the USSR under Gorbachev to 
redirect its trade and economic relations away from 
loss-making areas, namely the developing areas and the 
CMEA, towards the countries able to supply it with 
technology and know-how, that is the developed 
countries."
This is probably coupled with the consideration that 
increased security would enable the Soviet Union to 
release funds from military spending and direct them 
towards other needs of the economy. Though the initial 
impetus for the change in CMEA policy pre-dates 
Gorbachev's coming to power (he became Secretary General 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 
1985) at least some of the credit is his.
The fear of the implications of a unified EC market 
after 1992 probably added further incentive to closer 




























































































As Verny (1986, p.17) points out, the European 
opposition to the US embargo on sales of petroleum and 
gas technology in 1981 also softened Soviet attitudes to 
the Community. Better relations with the EC is probably 
regarded as a means of reducing the risk of Western 
sanctions on exports of grain and technology to Eastern 
Europe and of encouraging a more moderate stand with 
regards to the Cocom lists.
The CMEA move may to some extent also represent a 
recognition of the status quo, and a rather belated 
attempt to regain some control over the individual 
initiatives taken by various smaller East European 
states. As will be discussed in more detail, in 1980 
Romania signed what is effectively a fully-fledged trade 
agreement, and from the early 1980's other smaller East 
European countries, notably Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 
had been negotiating similar arrangements with the 
Community. As T.Schreiber (1986) notes, the Soviet Union 
was extremely worried about these 'autonomist' 
initiatives. Not only did it fear being isolated, but 
the Soviet Union also wanted to avoid being left behind 
its smaller East European neighbours in obtaining the 
economic benefits to be had from closer links with the 
Community. Partly as a question of negotiating tactics, 
the Soviet Union probably did not wish to be seen to be 
rushing to sign an agreement, and was quite prepared to 
let the smaller Eastern countries go ahead and pave the 
way.
Finally, as Matejka (1988, p.15) points out, the 
Soviet intention to join the GATT may have encouraged it 
to
"...court its chief opponents among the contrasting 
party, namely the United States and the EEC".
Certainly the change in attitude of the Soviet Union 
reflects an awareness that the EC had emerged as a new 
political power centre in the West.
5. Immediate Consequences of the 1988 Agreement
As various authors have pointed out (Bel (1988), 
Matejka (1988)), the 1988 declaration is important as a 
symbol, marking the end of one long process (the path to 
mutual official recognition between the two blocs) and 
the beginning of another. It reflects the relaxing of 




























































































the two blocs. Normalisation is here taken to mean the 
possibility of discussing problems; the negotiation of 
agreements if necessary; the end of attempts to hinder 
EC participation in international organisations and the 
establishment of formal relations, which generally 
entails accrediting diplomatic missions. The Joint 
Declaration did not however involve setting up 
diplomatic missions between the two blocs.
During the negotiations leading to the Joint 
Declaration some countries, notably the Soviet Union and 
the GDR made it clear that normalisation of their 
relations with the Community depended on a successful 
outcome at the bloc-to-bloc level, while others such as 
Hungary and Romania made no such link, and in fact 
seemed to use the possibility of establishing diplomatic 
links with the EC as a bargaining counter in obtaining 
EC concessions in the bilateral agreements which were 
being negotiated (Maslen, 1988, p.342). This together 
with the political tensions between Romania and the West 
explain why Romania was the only East European country 
not to send a request to set up a diplomatic mission to 
the EC in the summer following the Joint Declaration.
In addition to the establishment of diplomatic 
missions, the June 1988 Agreement led to immediate 
changes in two contexts, namely, the search for possible 
areas of cooperation between the two blocs, and opening 
the way for signing bilateral agreements between the EC 
and individual East European countries. Each will be 
discussed in turn, though the latter first requires the 
presentation of some institutional background. Finally 
the longer term implications of the 1988 Declaration for 
East-West trade and the internal structure of the CMEA 
will be considered.
6. Prospects for Cooperation between the Two Blocs since 
1988
The 1988 declaration called for cooperation between 
the two blocs in areas of "mutual interest". The areas, 
forms, methods for cooperation were to be decided in 
subsequent contacts and discussions between 
representatives of each side, and specifically, "on the 
basis of experience gained", new fields and methods of 
cooperation could be designated.
In the first of these subsequent meetings between the 
two sides a difference of opinion emerged because the 
CMEA first wanted to identify areas for cooperation, and 
only then discuss the forms and methods. In contrast the 
Community again raised the question of CMEA competences 
and maintained that it was necessary to establish what 




























































































before deciding what areas were of "mutual interest". As 
a UK official pointed out, Community's reaction may 
also be regarded as a response to uncertainty. Closer 
links are difficult when the legal competences of the 
CMEA are not only unclear, but also in a state of flux. 
The Community's insistence on knowing precisely what 
these competences are could be regarded as a fact­
finding exercise to establish where there are 
effectively areas for closer cooperation between the two 
blocs.
During earlier negotiations (1976, 1978 and 1980), 
four areas for cooperation between the two blocs were 
identified: standardization, presentation of 
statistics, environmental questions and macroeconomic 
forecasts. The Soviet Union would like to see 
cooperation in science and technology, transport and 
energy policy added to this list.
The EC raised the point that cooperation in some of 
these areas was already underway elsewhere so there was 
a risk of simply duplicating the work of wider, more 
complete fora such as the ECE (Economic Commission for 
Europe), the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 
and the CSCE. Alternatively certain questions might be 
better addressed at the bilateral level between the EC 
and individual East European countries. Furthermore, as 
John Maslen argues (1988,p.575), it is difficult to see 
how European-wide cooperation on transport or the 
environment could be carried out excluding such 
countries as Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and those 
of Scandinavia which are ECE members, but do not belong 
to the EC or CMEA. Nonetheless it seems worthwhile 
considering the prospects for cooperation in each of 
these areas in a little more detail to see how far these 
claims are true or what form cooperation could take.
With regards to economic forecasts and statistics, 
cooperation could first involve exchanges of 
information, though a further step could be discussions 
of the methods used and the development of harmonized 
statistical techniques. Within the CMEA uniform norms 
and standards are applied, especially for industrial 
products, and the EC is attemping to do the same. As the 
Seeler Report of the European Parliament (1986, p.18) 
points out, a systematic comparison of norms and 
standards used in the EC and CMEA could act as a first 
step in encouraging harmonization and reducing possible 
barriers to trade. However East-West collaboration on 
standardization, and the presentation of statistics 
already occurs in the ECE so the questions of 





























































































The EC and CMEA are already involved in the 
conventions on long-range transboundary air pollution 
(1979 and 1984), and the conventions on protection of 
the ozone layer (1985 and 1989). In addition the EC and 
Eastern countries have participated in five multilateral 
agreements on fisheries and the protection of various 
species, as well as the 1988 Baltic Conference which led 
to the first declaration on limiting harmful discharges 
into the Baltic, and the protection of Baltic seals. 
Though these wider fora may be more appropriate, they 
are not necessarily inconsistent with additional 
discussions at the EC-CMEA level, especially as the CMEA 
countries represent an important potential market for EC 
environmental technology which is among the foremost in 
the world.
In the context of transport policy, there could be 
discussions to develop infrastructure, especially with a 
view to expanding East-West trade. For many years the 
Community has complained of East European dumping 
practices in the transport sector, so these questions 
might be considered, though it would have to be 
established whether the bloc-to-bloc or bilateral level 
is the most suitable.
Cooperation in the energy sector could relate to 
extending energy supply networks such as gas and oil 
pipelines, or the electricity grid, though, as has been 
seen in the past, increasing interdependence in this 
sphere raises complex political questions. There could 
also be joint research into new alternative sources of 
energy.
With regards to nuclear fusion for energy production, 
following the Agreement between the EC, Japan, the USSR 
and Japan, in 1988 scientists in each began work on a 
design for a thermonuclear test reactor. Although after 
Chernobyl there is an EC interest in cooperation with 
regards to nuclear safety measures , especially as it is 
estimated that most of the 50 Soviet reactors do not 
conform to Western safety requirements (the Haensch 
Report of the European Parliament, 1988 p.36), two 
conventions have already been concluded within the IAEA 
with regards to early notification and assistance in 
cases of nuclear accidents or radiological emergency.
It has been suggested that possibile areas for EC- 
CMEA cooperation in science and technology could 
coincide with the EC Eureka Programme, especially as in 
1985 the CMEA adoped a remarkably similar programme for 
scientific and technical progress. However problems for 
this type of cooperation arise because of the Cocom list 
which imposes controls on "strategic" exports; from 




























































































from different approaches to technology (which is 
carried out to a large extent by firms in the West, and 
decided mainly from above in the East). In the West 
there is interest in collaboration on academic research, 
and in fields where the Soviet Union has an advantage, 
such as in certain areas of theoretical mathematics, 
laser technology, metal processing and material 
manufacture (the Seeler Report, 1986,p. 20). However 
there is a widespead view that the West has little to 
gain and much to lose from cooperation on many aspects 
of applied technology, given the difficulty East 
European countries have in converting research results 
into effective new production techniques.
7. The Application of the Common Commercial Policy 
in Trade with East Europe
Before discussing the recent bilateral agreements 
between the EC and individual East European countries, 
it is first necessary to describe the institutional 
framework in which trade and cooperation take place.
According to Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, after 
the ending of the transitional period the Community was 
to assume responsibility for matters relating to the 
common commercial policy:
"...particularly in regards to changes in tariff 
rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, 
the achievement of uniformity in measures of 
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect 
trade such as those to be taken in the case of dumping 
or subsidies."
In the face of opposition from both the EC member 
states and East European countries the Commission 
postponed the deadline for introduction of the common 
commercial policy vis-à-vis state trading countries from 
1970 till 1973 and again until 1975. From that date 
bilateral trade agreements between EC Member States and 
East European countries expired and the Community set 
out the broad lines of its future policy in the 1974 
'general model for trade agreements' or 'memorandum'. A 
copy of this memorandum was sent to each of the CMEA 
countries and contained the following elements (10):
1) the willingness of the Community to conclude trade 
agreements with individual CMEA Member States





























































































3) the reduction of quotas (except those falling under 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) )
4) ad hoc provisions for payments and trade financing
5) joint commissions were to be set up to supervise the 
agree-ments
The Community's offer to sign trade agreements with 
individual CMEA countries from 1975 was met with silence 
at the time (apart from China and later, Romania) owing 
to the political recognition problems. The Community 
announced that in the absence of such trade agreements, 
decisions would be taken unilaterally and would not be 
subject to negotiation, and this is the basis of the so- 
called autonomous trade policy. The latter relates 
essentially to the quantitative restrictions imposed on 
trade between EC and East European countries.
8. The Problems of East-West Trade which the EC Measures 
are Designed to Meet
The mechanisms which the EC adopts in its trade with 
Eastern Europe were evolved when the traditional model 
of central planning still applied in East European 
countries. To understand the form taken by these 
mechanisms a few words about this model and the 
problems it poses for East-West trade are necessary.
Under a system of central planning prices are set by 
a central authority and will not necessarily reflect 
relative scarcity. In general prices for labour, certain 
raw materials and energy will tend to be set at low 
levels, while it is likely that prices on more "socially 
unnecessary" products will be relatively high.
The use of this type of price structure to allocate 
resources can only operate if there is some kind of 
insulation of the central planned economy from market 
forces. It cannot be permitted that for example 
westerners enter the non-market economy and freely 
purchase products such raw materials or energy set at 
artificially low prices. Hence the state monopoly of 
foreign trade, and the incomplete currency 
convertibility which characterise a typical non-market 
economy. The monopoly of foreign trade enables central 
planners to incorporate international trade into plans 
while attempting to avoid disruption to the economy. 
Non-convertibility is usually operated by a system of 
multiple exchange rates. This generally includes an 
official rate (which reflects national prestige more 




























































































rate, though even the latter is often mistrusted by 
Western businessmen who frequently insist on payment in 
Western currency, or various forms of compensation 
payment.
Given the persistent shortages of hard currency of 
these countries, export industries are often given 
priority This may imply using the best, or most 
advanced techniques to make the product for export 
competive on world markets. For example a higher level 
of automation might be used than would be justified by 
the same low labour costs in a market economy. 
Moreover, as Denton (1987, p.203) argues,
"One of the essential elements of this competiveness 
is the price. The lower the price of the product in the 
West in relation to the equivalent Western product, the 
more competitive it is. "
In trading with non-market economies, on the import 
side Western countries therefore fear that their markets 
might be flooded by low-priced products. To meet this 
threat various measures have been evolved: quantitative 
restrictions, safeguard measures, anti-dumping measures, 
and voluntary export restraint agreements. On the export 
side, the centralised planning system means that there 
cannot be meaningful reciprocation of Western tariff 
concessions. Some other form of commitment on the part 
of the Eastern partner to allow access to its markets 
has to be found, and the most common solution is to 
encompass this commitment in a bilateral trade and/or 
cooperation agreement. Given the hard currency shortages 
and indebtedness of Eastern countries, export credit 
policies also play a crucial role in encouraging Western 
exports. The form taken by each of these devices in the 
context of the EC will now be discussed.
Economic and political considerations are 
inextricably linked in the context of East-West trade, 
and nowhere is this more true than with regards to 
technology tranfer. The implications of the Cocom lists 
for EC trade with the East will therefore also be 
indicated very briefly.
9. The Autonomous Trade Policy
As Peter Marsh (1978, p. 50) describes, the 
autonomous trade policy represented very much the lowest 
common denominator in that it simply put a "Community 
label on existing national trade legislation". The 
bilateral trade agreements between EC member states and 
East European countries had contained lists of import 




























































































harmonize these restrictions they were incorporated en 
bloc and virtually unchanged into Community legislation.
In accordance with the common commercial policy, the 
Community is responsible for the lists of restrictions 
of each of the member states and for the liberalisation 
lists. When the last national restriction against a 
particular product is dropped, the Commission adds that 
product to the liberalisation list and it becomes 
subject to the surveillance and safeguards procedures 
for goods coming from GATT members.
The commitment to liberalisation of these lists set out 
in the 1974 memorandum has to some extent been met. Each 
year actual levels of imports are examined to see how 
far quotas have been used and where concessions can be 
made. Concessions entail either abolishing restrictions, 
enlarging quotas, or introducing quotas for imports 
which were previously non-liberalised. As John Maslen 
reports (1983, p.327), the decision usually enlarges the 
quotas by 1.5-3.5 %. As a result of some 7600 Nimexe 
headings of the Community's common customs tariff,about 
1420 were partially or totally under qualitative 
restrictions in at least one member state in 1985 
compared with some 1570 reported by K.Taylor (1977) for 
1975. The 1982 Irmer Report of the European Parliament 
called for the liberalising of quotas to be made 
conditional on the signing of bilateral trade agreements 
with individual East European countries and, as will be 
shown below, these agreements (especially that with 
Hungary) and the prospect of 1992 have lent new impetus 
to the liberalisation process.
Nonetheless the Community maintains more quantitative 
restrictions in its trade with state-trading countries 
than with any other group of countries. According to the 
EC Commission, some 3-5% of actual EC-East European 
trade is affected by such restrictions, the exact 
percentage varying according to the product and country 
in question, but the impact on potential trade, or trade 
which would take place in the absence of such 
restrictions is much greater. Many of the restrictions 
are on textiles (within the framework of the Multifibre 
Agreement), footware, chemical products, some electronic 
components, toys, glassware and ceramics, some wooden 
products, certain agricultural goods and the metallurgy 
sector so, at least in some cases, are of considerable 
importance to the East European country concerned. 
During the interviews Western trade officials described 
these quotas as "relics of the past" maintained in 
response to local pressures to preserve employment, and 
did not consider them to be very important. One 
official even suggested that East European insistence on 




























































































cases where low trade levels were in fact due to poor 
economic performance in the Eastern country. However it 
was admitted that such restrictions run counter to the 
principles of Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome.
According to the EC Commission, it will not be 
possible to have these lists of national import 
restrictions after 1992. Either imports will have to be 
liberalised, or, if they are sensitive, Community-wide 
restrictions will have to be introduced. The latter 
could take various forms, one possibility being 
voluntary export restraint agreements at the EC level. 
Although the GATT does not look favourably on such 
agreements, they are extremely widely used, and at least 
have the advantage over quotas of having to be prolonged 
(whereas quotas must be removed).
10. EC Anti-Dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws
The issue of anti-dumping in EC trade with East 
Europe is too important to be left out, but too complex 
to be dealt with adequately here (11).
The basic problem arises from the price structure and 
incomplete convertibility of non-market economies. This 
means that in setting export prices non-market economies 
will have to rely on information about prices not only 
in the country to which they are exporting, but also in 
potential analogue countries (as will be explained 
below). If their information is inaccurate, they may be 
subject to charges of dumping.
As Denton (1987) points out a further misconception 
frequent in the West is that non-market economies 
present a problem for dumping because their prices are 
unverifiable or inaccurate. Most East European countries 
could (and probably would) provide detailed information 
about production costs. However the main difficulty is 
not one of accuracy, but the whole complex of 
distortions arising from centrally fixed prices.
According to EC legislation, dumping is said to 
occur when the price of an export to the EC is lower 
than the 'normal value' of a like product. If the 
dumping is found to cause injury or threat of injury and 
the "interest of the Community" so requires, the EC 
Commission may impose an anti-dumping duty, though in 
most cases it simply insists on a price undertaking from 
the exporting country involved.
A frequent complaint of East European countries is 
that the EC uses its anti-dumping measures as an 
instrument of protectionism. According to certain East 




























































































although formally EC anti-dumping regulations conform to 
GATT standards, their application is said to be 
particularly "vigorous". Wetter (1986) also reports that 
threat of EC anti-dumping measures was a major factor in 
deciding the smaller East European countries to sign 
bilateral agreements with the EC with regards to steel.
However, as Tables 1-4 suggest, at least in recent 
years the threat of anti-dumping measures may be 
greater than their actual impact. Moreover, according 
to Pelkmans (1984 pp.248),
"A considerable part of the procedure is public, 
while criteria are known, and the considerations 
underlying every duty are to be published in the 
Official Journal. Such a procedure greatly reduces the 
constituency politics that might turn anti-dumping 
policy into a protectionist device that it shouldn't 
be. "
However, there are two areas where the East European 
complaint would seem to be grounded. The first relates 
to the way in which the 'normal value' is calculated for 
non-market countries. According to EC legislation 
'normal value' is defined as the market price paid or 
payable in the exporting country or in third countries. 
As this definition is not appropriate for non-market 
economies, the EC procedure follows the GATT in basing 
normal value on prices in an analogue country. As 
various authors point out (12), this method cannot allow 
for the possibility that lower prices in the non-market 
economy might effectively reflect comparative advantage 
rather than the distortions of the central planning 
system.
Secondly, as a step-by-step analysis of the EC anti­
dumping procedure shows, the EC authories have a certain 
amount of discretion, or flexibility in applying the 
legislation. As the the EC authorities are subject to 
pressure from EC producers and rely on them for 
information, it seems likely that at least at times the 
interests of domestic producers are given special 
consideration.
Given the nature of state intervention in centrally 
planned economies, in theory the EC could at times apply 
anti-subsidy measures to these countries. However to 
avoid the political issues which the anti-subsidy 
measure raises, in practice the anti-dumping instrument 
has always been used.
The safeguard procedure is used to protect the EC 
from excessively low prices or market disruption. In 




























































































suspended so limiting or preventing imports from third 
countries. However the safeguard procedure is rarely 
used as it is considered a double-edged weapon, running 
the risk of retaliation. Moreover, unlike antidumping 
measures, it generally has to be applied in a non- 
discriminatory way. A notable example of its use was the 
EC suspension of beef imports from 1974 to 1977.
In 1984 (Reg. 2641/84) a "new commercial instrument" 
was introduced by which the EC can take measures with 
regards to "illicit commercial practices". This measure 
is modelled on section 301 of the US Trade Agreements 
Act. Whereas previously EC trade policy instruments were 
designed to avoid injury to domestic producers, the 1984 
measure is aimed at protecting EC trade interests in 
third countries.
11. Export Credit Subsidies
Although a considerable degree of coordination of 
the export credit policies of EC member states has been 
achieved, transfer of authority to the EC level has been 
limited, despite a 1975 decision of the Court of Justice 
(13) that export credit subsidies were an instrument of 
commercial policy and so fell within the competences of 
the Community listed in Article 113 of the Treaty.
With regards to the need for coordination and 
harmonization of the export credit systems of the EC 
member states, there is a risk that especially in times 
of recession countries will use export credit subsidies 
to favour their own businessmen. This has the effect of 
distorting competition, and may even lead to an export 
credit war. The risk is thought to be particularly grave 
in the case of business with Eastern Europe given the 
importance of export credit guarantees, which for 
example cover an estimated 20% of UK trade with these 
countries (14).
The coordination of the export credit policies of the 
EC member states has taken place at both the EC and OECD 
levels. The main forum for international discussions on 
export credit matters is the OECD, and this has the 
obvious advantage over the EC of including the US, Japan 
and other major industrialized countries.
Apart from in discussions on technical questions, the 
Community represents the member states in the OECD forum 
and the individual EC countries have only observer 
status there. The arrangements agreed in the OECD forum 
are incorporated into Community law and are therefore 




























































































The first of these OECD arrangements was agreed in 
1976 and entailed an international consensus or 
"gentleman's agreement" on interest rates, maturities 
and other loan conditions. In 1978 detailed guidelines 
to implement this consensus were drawn up and in 1983 a 
tightening of the consensus was agreed. The overall 
tendancy has been for the consensus to move in favour of 
tighter controls of export credit subsidies and the 
general opinion seems to be that the OECD arrangements 
have been successful in confining some of the worst 
excesses. It has also contributed to increased 
transparency and discipline in reporting. There have 
also been proposals to extend the arrangement to new 
members such as Turkey and Brazil. However several 
problems remain, as a European Parliament Document (15) 
explains:
"Rapidly rising, but also diverging interest rates 
have meant widening and varying gaps between market 
rates and "consensus" interest rates and hence a great 
increase in the interest rate subsidies by certain 
countries in particular."
Further difficulties arise because of different 
opinions as to what the consensus should entail and 
where it should be leading, with the Japanese pushing 
for lower consensus interest rates, and the US for 
higher ones. The EC position, which opposes any major 
adjustment to the consensus, also masks a wide range of 
opinions. On the one hand the British maintain that the 
consensus should ultimately aim at eliminating all 
export subsidies, while on the other the French want to 
restrict the consensus to its present limited role of 
avoiding the worst excesses.
In addition to realising at least some degree of 
coordination at OECD level, Community representation of 
the member states has meant that a common EC position 
has to be worked out. This takes place in the EC 
'Nationgroup1 or Policy Coordination Group for Credit 
Insurance, Credit Guarantees and Financial Credits (16). 
This body is responsible for carrying out the EC 
information and consultation procedure in matters of 
export credit subsidies (17) and all new credits of over 
5 years duration have to be submitted to this procedure. 
According to those involved (i.e. the Commission and 
national officials and the representatives of some 
banks) the consultation procedure works fairly 
efficiently and as well as enabling exchange of 
information, has led to a certain convergence of opinion 
among member states. It was felt that a great deal had 
been achieved on certain issues, and mixed credits were 
cited as an example. The group meets every three weeks 




























































































contentious issues are raised. Though at times the 
Commission has difficulty obtaining information from the 
member states, it was thought that ultimately it usually 
succeeds. The member states usually go a considerable 
way towards meeting the complaints made against them in 
this group, and although ultimate redress is possible 
within the EC Council, this is rarely necessary.
The main topic discussed within the coordination 
group is the OECD consensus, though this is also the 
forum for considering harmonization and the possible 
introduction of Community export credit measures. 
However many of those involved felt that harmonization 
was too difficult in view of the divergent monetary 
conditions of the EC member states and differences in 
their financial institutions and tax arrangements. 
Moreover it was thought that continued progress in 
extending the umbrella of consensus would render 
harmonization and the introduction of Community measures 
superfluous. Although some progress towards 
harmonization is being made, the EC is forced to work at 
the pace of the slowest.
It is still too early to assess the likely effects of 
1992 on the export credit practices of the EC member 
states. Credit agencies in some member states such as 
France and Belgium are preparing for the possibility of 
operating in other EC member states, amending their 
statutes where necessary. However, to date no opinion 
from the EC Commission has emerged.
Turning specifically to the East European countries, 
it was stated that the process of perestroika in the 
Soviet Union raised considerable difficulties for 
Western credit agencies. These agencies are now having 
to deal directly with enterprises and up to 150 Soviet 
ministries directly. Whereas in the past the Soviet 
central bank was responsible for all financing, these 
enterprises and ministries are now self-financing, but 
without experience in such matters. The Western credit 
agencies are faced with partners with no track record, 
in a situation of uncertainty and lack of information. 
What for instance will happen if a Soviet ministry or 
enterprise exceeds its budget? This uncertainty has led 
to delays in {he granting of Western credits, and for 
example in the case of the British Export Credit 
Guarantee Department has led to the value of contracts 
in 1988 falling below the 1987 level of £400 million.
Also in the case of joint ventures with the Soviet 
Union, the question of who will stand guarantor on the 
Soviet side, and the possibilities for repatriating 
profits have created wariness on the part of Western 




























































































also meant that most Western agencies are no longer 
prepared to grant medium- or long-term credits, and 
short-term activies have been relatively limited.
12. Technology Transfer
The international forum in the West for discussions 
of technology transfer is Cocom (the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls), which is an 
informal committee of Nato composed of Japan and all 
Nato members except Iceland and Spain. Cocom is not 
covered by any treaty, and its proceedings are carried 
out in private. The main functions of Cocom are to 
maintain lists of strategic items subject to embargo and 
monitoring and to try and secure agreements on 
enforcement, so as to minimize exports of those items to 
the USSR, the seven smaller East European countries, 
Afghanistan, China, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam.
There are three Cocom lists relating to the export
of:
a) atomic energy materials and facilities
b) munitions
c) industrial goods of potential military use.
Export of many items on the first two lists are 
banned completely, and it is the third list which is 
subject to most attention.
In order to sell an item on the Cocom list to a 
Warsaw Pact country, an export license has to be 
obtained. For the most sensitive items, the question of 
whether to grant an export licence will be decided at a 
Cocom meeting in Paris, and these are called "general 
exception" applications. For less sensitive items an 
export license will be granted by the trade ministry in 
the country concerned "at national discretion", possibly 
after consultation with the defence or foreign affairs 
ministries.
A major complaint of businessmen regards the time lag 
involved in obtaining an export license through the 
"general exception" procedure in Paris. 13% of all 
applications have to follow this procedure, and though 
in theory there is a deadline of 12 weeks, in practice 
this is suspended if any question is raised so the 
waiting period is often of 6 months or a year (18).
A further problem concerns the slow pace at which 
Cocom reviews the lists. The last complete review took 




























































































review of one quarter of the lists each year. As many 
businessmen have pointed out (19), especially in the 
computer industry, a review period of 4 years is longer 
than the life-cycle of many products. According to the 
Haensch Report of the European Parliament (1988, p.32), 
although the decisions taken within Cocom in January 
1988 were a step in the right direction, there remains a 
need to ensure that the lists are further reduced and 
published, and to simplify control procedures in order 
to avoid uncertainty and unnecessary bureaucracy.
In recent years Cocom has been under considerable 
strain especially because of diverging views between the 
US and Western Europe with regards to trade sanctions 
and embargoes (20). These differences were reflected for 
example in the sharp exchanges over the gas pipeline (in 
particlar during the Ottawa Summit of 1978) and the fact 
that US sanctions against the Soviet Union following 
events in Afghanistan and Poland were only matched by an 
EC commitment not to undermine these sanctions (21). 
There have also been complaints that the US is using its 
dominant position to further political and commercial 
interests, as for example the French criticism of the 
American move to exempt China from the Cocom lists. In 
part these differences may be said to reflect the EC's 
much higher level of dependence on trade with the CMEA 
countries than that of the US. Moreover the composition 
of trade was very different, with grain exports being 
especially important for the US, while Europe is more 
concerned with exports of industrial plant and 
equipment. Indeed the Soviet Union is the largest single 
importer of EC machine tools and the prospect it offers 
as a huge market is considered with interest by the EC 
electronics and other high technology industries.
The obvious implication for the EC would be to adopt 
a more united stand with regards to technology policy. 
This might also help to encourage a more moderate 
approach within Cocom. However, that the member states 
are still a long way from this is evident for example 
from the debate over economic sanctions following events 
in Poland in 1981 when Greece was totally opposed to any 
action, and Denmark later wanted to pull out (22). Even 
with regards to the Cocom lists there are variations 
among the member states, with possibly the UK adhering 
closest to the US line and France, the least. A further 
problem arises in that technology policy is not among 
the Community competences listed in the Treaty of Rome. 
Indeed, insofar as technology has direct or indirect 
military applications it is specifically excluded from 
Community powers by Article 223 of the Treaty.
A further question arises as to the impact of Cocom on 




























































































of the European Parliament (1982) the result of Cocom 
has been to force CMEA states into developing their own 
technologies in fields such as offshore drilling or 
robots for car production, so reducing dependence on the 
West. It has been argued that in the absence of Cocom, 
US exports to East Europe would have been greater, 
limiting the potential market for EC suppliers. However 
a Trade and Industry Committee Report of the House of 
Commons (23) not only found clear cases in which Cocom 
had been breached, but also convincing evidence that 
the Cocom restrictions hindered the process of economic 
reform in East Europe, encouraged high technology 
exports from other parts of the World to East Europe, 
and entailed a considerable loss of business for EC 
firms. One businessman maintained that in the absence of 
regulations, some business could be doubled or even 
tripled. The Report recommends more analysis of the 
actual impact of technology transfer on the East 
European economies (of the type being carried out by the 
OECD (24)) and more emphasis being placed in Cocom 
procedures on the possible end uses of technology. In 
this way it might be easier to draw the military/non- 
military borderline and depoliticize the issues for 
certain types of technology transfer.
13. Sectoral Trade Agreements
Despite the problem of political recognition, 
economic necessity forced all the smaller East European 
countries except Albania and the GDR (for which such 
arrangements were often rendered unnecessary by the 
special German provisions (25)) to sign sectoral 
agreements with the Community. As Tosi describes (1987, 
p.61), these agreements were essentially "low profile" 
and described as "technical" to minimize their political 
importance. Table 5 sets out the 22 agreements existing 
in 1988.
The first instance of positive integration or policy 
to be implemented at the EC level was the Common 
Agricultural Policy, which came into effect from 
1967/8. This had immediate repercussions for some of the 
smaller East European countries which had traditionally 
exported agricultural products to EC countries, forcing 
them into a response. Between 1965 and 1980 all the 
smaller East European countries except the GDR and 
Albania signed "agricultural arrangements" concerning 
the conditions of imports of specific East European 
agricultural products into the EC. These arrangements 
cover various products including poultry, eggs, wine and 




























































































More recently export restraint agreements setting 
quotas for imports of sheep and goatmeat to the EC have 
been signed with all the smaller East European countries 
as can be seen from Table 5. These were followed by the 
similar agreements on young calves for fattening signed 
with Hungary, Poland and Romania in 1988.
In 1976 Romania signed a textile agreement with the 
Community which was followed by textile agreements with 
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and China.
In 1978 Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed agreements 
for steel with the Community. These agreements allowed 
market penetration of the EC by up to 90% of Czech or 
Hungarian steel sales providing a given EC price was 
respected (26). Similar steel agreements with Bulgaria, 
Romania and Poland followed.
Many of these agreements involved "voluntary" 
commitments on the part of the East European countries 
with regards to minimum prices and in many cases to 
volume controls as well. As a general comment on this 
type of agreement, though they appear an improvement on 
the automomous setting of policy, the question must be 
raised as to how far they are in fact "voluntary". Often 
the exporter has only the choice of accepting the 
demands made by the importing country (or group of 
countries in this case) or losing its place on that 
market. In addition, because the agreement is accepted 
"voluntarily", to all appearances the importing country 
(group of countries) has not violated the non­
discrimination rules of GATT (where these apply), even 
though there may be patent differences in treatment.
In 1977 the decision of the Community to introduce a 
common fisheries policy and to claim a 200-mile maritime 
economic zone led to negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
East Germany and Poland . As Peter Marsh (1978, p.61) 
points out, although the Soviets played down the 
significance of this, the Community considered the 
negotiations an important milestone in the path towards 
political recognition.
Interpreting the acceptability of sectoral agreements 
widely, in addition to its textile and steel agreements, 
in 1980 Romania signed a trade agreement with the EC 
covering other industrial sectors and establishing a 
joint commission. The agreement was originally for five 
years, but has been rolled over, as is a frequent 
practice with such agreements. The aim of 
introducing these agreements separately was to avoid the 




























































































conform to the official CMEA view that sectoral but not 
general trade agreements were acceptable.
Though the agreement did not entail tariff 
concessions, it commited the EC to abolishing or 
suspending certain quantitative restrictions on imports 
from Romania, in particular of some chemicals, 
fertilizers, glass and ceramics. In return Romania was 
to increase and diversify its imports of EC products.
The terms offered by the EC in the Romanian trade 
agreement were relatively favourable partly for 
political reasons. It was thought that in this was it 
might be possible to lure Romania to the West, and 
encourage the process of internal economic reform. From 
the point of view of this objective the agreement must 
be regarded as a failure.
In 1983 a Contact Group on Agriculture was also 
established between Romania and the EC and this meets to 
discuss trade in certain agricultural products.
14. Cooperation Agreements
Speaking of the implementation of the Common 
Commercial Policy vis-à-vis state trading countries, in 
1974 John Pinder wrote :
"The Commission's long march down the route outlined 
in the Treaty of Rome will soon have reached its 
destination and it looks as if on arrival not much will 
be found".
Nowhere is this more true than in the context of 
agreements for "economic, scientific, industrial and 
technological cooperation" between EC Member States and 
East European countries. Following implementation of the 
Community provisions in 1975 all the then EC Member 
states rushed to replace their bilateral trade 
agreements with East European countries with cooperation 
agreements. As discussed in some detail elsewhere (27) 
these cooperation agreements have operated to all 
intents and purposes as trade agreements, and have been 
the source of a prolonged disagreement between the EC 
and its member states.
According to the EC member states, Community 
responsibility should be restricted to the functions 
listed in Article 1X3, and responsibility for 





























































































The view that this list of competences is exhaustive 
was strongly challenged by the Commission. In
particular, the Commission pointed to the decline of the 
tariff on industrial products, and the emergence of new 
commercial instruments as evidence that Community 
powers would need to be more extensive to be effective 
in implementing the common commercial policy.
The upshot of the debate over respective competences 
was that while in 1975 the Community assumed
responsibility for all trade agreements, government- 
level cooperation agreements remain the responsibility 
of the member states and the authority of the Community 
over these agreements is limited to where they affect 
trade. This division of authority has never been 
accepted by the Commission. At the time it put forward 
various proposals, such as the negotiation of framework 
agreements which would complement agreements already 
contracted by the member states, or coordination of the 
various bilateral government-level cooperation 
agreements by the Commission, but these did not meet the 
approval of the member states. Instead what was agreed 
was the establishment of an information and consultation 
procedure for cooperation agreements between the member 
states and East European countries. This procedure, 
which was set up in accordance with Council Directive 
74/393 of of July 1974 has the following aims:
1. to ensure that intergovernmental cooperation 
agreements conform to the common policies of the EC.
2. to encourage exchanges of information
3. to assess the value of measures which the Community 
might adopt to encourage cooperation agreements.
In order to implement this procedure a special 
committee of high- ranking civil servants drawn from 
each of the member states and from the Commission was 
established, and meets at regular intervals.
According to EC officials the procedure is not very 
efficient because of the reluctance (or failure) of the 
member states to consult or provide information about 
their agreements.
There have been several cases in which clauses in 
individual government-level cooperation agreements of 
the EC member states have been challenged as running 
counter to Article 113 of the Treaty, because, for 
instance they included MFN clauses, and strictly the 
granting of such concessions should fall within the 
competence of the Community. However the real problem 




























































































commissions which, far from simply creating the 
framework for cooperation, involve the governments of EC 
member states in an ongoing process of export promotion 
for their firms,
15. Bilateral Trade Agreements since 1988
15/i. The 1988 EC-Hungarian Agreement on Trade 
and Commercial and Economic Cooperation
The first tangible result of resolution of the 
political recognition problem was the ten-year trade and 
cooperation agreement between the EC and Hungary. The 
discussions leading to the agreement date from 1983 but 
the climate of 1988 certainly influenced the final form 
of the agreement. The agreement represents a milestone 
on at least two counts, firstly the extent of the 
concessions offered to Hungary by the EC, and secondly 
the shift in power it entailed between the EC and its 
member states.
Of great importance in determining the final form 
of the 1988 agreement was Hungarian membership of GATT. 
Not only did this enable an MFN clause to be inserted 
into the agreement, but it also formed the basis for the 
Hungarian request for the reduction of EC quantitive 
restrictions which were said to run counter to GATT 
obligations. The EC was prepared to go a long way 
towards meeting Hungarian demands because of its 
recognition of Hungary as being the East European 
country which has introduced the most far-reaching 
economic reforms and because of a desire to encourage 
this process. As John Maslen (1988, p.571) states, the 
agreement "represents what is in effect the limit of the 
trading policy possibilities of the EEC vis-à-vis a 
state-trading country". The Ercini Report of the 
European Parliament (1988, p.7) points out that the 
Hungarian agreement will be used as a precedent for 
other East European countries only if they make similar 
progress in reform.
The programme to reduce quantitive restrictions was one 
of the most important elements of the agreement, and was 
the subject of negotiations for more than a year, as 
Hungary wanted the EC to declare its willingness in 
principle to remove all quantitative restrictions. 
Initially the EC wanted to keep these restrictions as an 
option for the most sensitive goods for an indefinite 
period, so the outcome represents a compromise.
The agreement did not apply to ECSC (European Coal 
and Steel Community) products nor to textiles covered by 
the MFA (Multifibre Agreement). In addition the 




























































































conditions, the organisation of seminars, fairs, 
business weeks etc. and certain exchanges of technical 
expertise. The exact areas and methods of cooperation 
were to be decided in subsequent discussions, and 
especially during joint committee meetings.
As Maslen (1988,P.570) summarizes, under the heading 
of cooperation Hungary agreed to give non-discriminatory 
treatment to the EC
"in such matters as the issue of licenses, the 
administration of Hungary's global quota on consumer 
goods, the facilities provided for businessmen who wish 
to set up representations or agencies in Hungary and the 
treatment of trading partners in matters of intellectual 
property."
In addition to being initialled by the EC Commission 
and signed by the Council (a formality) the agreement 
had to be ratified by the European Parliament since (p.l 
of the agreement):
"...it appears that certain measures of economic 
cooperation provided for by the agreement exceed the 
powers of action provided for in the Treaty and in 
particular those specified in the field of the common 
commercial policy"
Furthermore the agreement also contained a 
specification that it would in no way prevent the EC 
member states from continuing
"...to undertake bilateral activities with Hungary in 
the field of economic cooperation, and to conclude, 
where appropriate, new economic cooperation agreements 
with Hungary."(28)
This formula was initially used for the EC's 
cooperation agreement with Canada in 1976 (29) and has 
to be interpreted in the context of the ongoing debate 
between the EC and its member states over their 
respective competences with regards to cooperation 
agreements. On the one hand the EC member states have 
been allowed to continue their bilateral cooperation 
agreements, and the Hungarian agreement contains the 
clause that such agreements appear beyond the 
competences of the Community listed in the Treaty of 
Rome. Against this the phrase "it appears" in the first 
quotation suggests that the Community has not accepted 
this definition of its competences, and the mere fact 
that it has signed this agreement represents an 
extension of its powers. This is likely to be 
particularly true with regards to the activities of the 




























































































arrangements between the EC and Hungary, but given the 
importance of agricultural trade , "the possibility of 
granting each other reciprocal concessions on a product 
by product basis" (Article 6 of the Agreement) was to 
be considered.
The agreement established that quantitive 
restrictions on other products were to be liberalised in 
three phases. Within a year of the agreement quantitive 
restrictions on a list of the least sensitive products 
(which had not been imported from Hungary during the 
three previous years) were to be abolished. There was 
then to be progressive liberalisation of the next 
level of sensitive products by 1993. In a number of 
cases these goods had already been liberalized 
temporarily, or the previous quotas had not been fully 
utilised (Maslen, 1988, p.570).This process of phasing 
out over a five year period could either take the form 
of gradually increasing the value of the quota, or of 
liberalisation as and when. Finally, conditional on a 
safeguard clause, all remaining quotas would be 
liberalised between 1993 and 1995. Consultations would 
the be held before the agreement came to an end in 1998.
Only the liberalisation of the third class of quotas 
(from 1993-95) would be affected by changes resulting 
from 1992 and the agreement provides for the 
consideration by both parties of possible adjustments to 
the EC regime after 1992.
The agreement also contained a safeguard clause to 
prevent "serious injury to domestic producers of like or 
directly competitive products" (Article 7, para. 1) 
which permitted the EC to take unilateral action to 
limit imports or impose a duty if necessary. The 
stringency of this clause is the quid pro quo which 
Hungary had to accept in return for the deadlines on EC 
quotas.
The agreement entailed the establishment of a joint 
commission between the EC and Hungary which was to 
ensure the proper functioning of the agreement, and to 
seek ways of encouraging trade and cooperation. The 
latter would include assessing recent trends in trade, 
making recommendations to overcome problems in trade and 
cooperation, identifying new possibilities for trade and 
cooperation, and exchanging information on macro- 
economic plans, forecasts, and matters relating to 
East-West trade and cooperation.
The cooperation to be encouraged by the agreement was 
to be of an economic, scientific and technical nature. 
Its promotion was to entail exchanges of information and 




























































































coordinate their positions and reach a Community line. 
In addition the agreement contains a clause stating that 
its provisions should be substituted for those of 
agreements between the EC member states and Hungary in 
cases where they are incompatible or identical. 
Certainly the increased contact with Hungary will 
improve the flow of information to the Community making 
it likely that the consultation procedure becomes a more 
effective control over cooperation agreements of the 
member states. Nonetheless the issue of who is 
responsible has to some extent been shelved, and it 
seems likely that the existence of cooperation 
agreements at both the EC and member-state level will 
lead to conflicts in the future.
As Tosi points out (1987,p.69), given this debate 
about the Community's competences, the inclusion of 
economic cooperation in the Hungarian agreement has more 
political than economic significance, and should be 
interpreted as gesture on the part of the EC to 
underline the importance it attaches to normalization of 
relations with Hungary. However it also marks a 
recognition of the opportunities for setting up joint 
ventures with Hungary. The far-reaching legislative and 
economic reforms carried out have meant that Hungary is 
at present the East European country which offers the 
most feasible prospects for joint ventures with Western 
firms.
15/ii. The Czechoslovak Agreement
In 1983 Czechoslovakia began negotiations with the EC 
with the aim of signing additional agreements covering a 
number of sectors of particular importance to that 
country such as glassware and ceramics. The Community 
suggested an agreement covering all industrial goods, 
similar to the 1980 Romanian agreement, and this was 
eventually signed in December 1988 (30). The agreement 
did not cover agricultural goods or products covered by 
the ECSC or Multifibre agreement, nor did it extend to 
economic cooperation. Not only is agricultural trade 
relatively unimportant for Czechoslovakia, but total 
trade with the EC accounts for only 10% of all Czech 
trade as compared with 25% of all Hungarian exports 
going to the Community.
As a trade agreement, based on Article 113 of the 
Treaty, the Czechoslovak agreement did not raise the 
question of Community competences in the same way as the 
Hungarian agreement. Nonetheless it was ratified by the 
European Parliament as it was considered an "agreement 
of political importance".
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Taking account of Czechoslovakia's membership of 
GATT, the five-year agreement contained a programme to 
reduce quantitative restrictions, but unlike the 
Hungarian agreement, no deadlines were set. The 
programme is therefore open-ended in the sense that as 
long as some concessions are made, then the Community 
will meet its obligations. A joint commission was to be 
established to supervise the liberalization of EC quotas 
as well as to survey the application of the agreement 
and overall trade relations between the two parties. The 
agreement also contained a safeguard clause.
For its part Czechoslovakia made a commitment to 
encourage EC imports by, inter alia, providing 
information about import and investment plans, 
encouraging closer links between Western businessmen and 
their Eastern counterparts, and carrying out measures to 
promote trade such as business fairs.
15/iii. Agreements with Other East European Countries
Romania expressed interest in a follow-up to its 1980 
agreement which would also cover agricultural products 
and contain elements of cooperation. However the 
Community found the Romanian demands for reductions in 
quantitive restrictions eccessive and was concerned 
about the large and growing Romanian trade deficit with 
EC countries. Moreover the Community did not feel that 
Romania had met the commitment in the 1980 agreement to 
increase and diversify imports from the EC. In recent 
years not only have Romanian imports from the EC 
fallen, but the Community also maintains that the 
quality of economic information from Romania has 
deteriorated. The internal political situation in 
Romania and especially the destruction of villages and 
the resettlement of the rural population was another 
source of tension and led the EC to break off 
negotiations for a new agreement with Romania in March 
1989.
Poland and Bulgaria would also like as wide-ranging 
agreements as possible, and there seems a degree of 
consensus within the EC to offer more than was given in 
the Czechoslovak agreement, especially in the case of 
Poland.
Poland wants to include economic cooperation in the 
agreement to facilitate the setting up of joint 
ventures. However the Community maintains that it is 
still too early to assess how the revised Polish 
legislation on joint ventures will operate in practice, 
especially as much of that legislation still remains to 




























































































prevailing in that country. The level of Polish 
indebtedness also poses an obstacle to the extension of 
trade and cooperation.
This is not the case for Bulgaria, which has a 
relatively low level of indebtedness by East European 
standards, and which has experienced steady economic 
growth in recent years. Economic reforms have also been 
introduced in Bulgaria, though again it is uncertain how 
far the situation will change in practice.
The Soviet Union is also pressing for an agreement, 
but has encountered a certain hesitancy on the part of 
the EC, mainly because of the uncertainty engendered by 
perestroika. Questions also arise as to whether the 
Soviet interest in joining GATT will meet with 
success. The size of the USSR has stimulated EC interest 
in its importance as a market, but has also led to fears 
that trade liberalisation could run the risk of EC 
markets being flooded. The Soviets are requesting 
reductions in quantitative restrictions, and economic 
cooperation in virtually all areas of Community 
competence as they are keen to set up joint ventures on 
Soviet territory.
As John Maslen reports (1988,p.574), the EC 
Commission is examining possible areas of cooperation 
with the Soviet Union. These include: protection of the 
environment; fishing policy and especially the question 
of access of EC fishermen to certain Soviet fishing 
zones for example in the Baltic; energy policy and 
particularly safety matters following Chernobyl; 
shipping policy, given the allegations of Soviet dumping 
by EC shipowners, and scientific cooperation despite the 
problems this poses for the Cocom lists. Soviet 
politicians have also expressed interest in cooperation 
going beyond traditional spheres, for example with 
regards to fighting illnesses such as cancer and AIDS, 
and in the prognosis and assessment of modern research 
and technologies (Haensch Report of the European
Parliament, p.35).
The GDR was the last of the East European countries 
to request an agreement from the Community probably 
because the special provisions for its relationship with 
the FRG render an agreement with other EC countries less 
urgent. The GDR is interested in just a trade agreement 
without elements of cooperation.
Statements to the effect that the Community is 
willing to have relations, and even sign a trade 
agreement with Albania (31) have so far not met with any 
response, suggesting the continuation of that country's 






























































































Likely Consequences of the 1988 Joint Declaration
There has been much debate about the likely impact 
of the 1988 agreement. On the one hand there are those 
who follow the pessimistic view voiced by Pinder (1986) 
that international agreements have little impact on 
actual levels of trade and cooperation. According to 
this view the relatively limited volume of trade between 
EC and CMEA countries (see Tables 6 and 7) is the result 
of a number of legal, institutional, political, and 
economic factors which are unlikely to disappear 
overnight.
This opinion of the role of government action in 
trade promotion would seem to be excessively negative. 
Improved official relations not only enable increased 
information and understanding, but also influence the 
climate in which trade and investment decisions are 
taken. Moreover in dealing with East Europe, Western 
businessmen still usually have to face foreign trade 
organisations which occupy a monopoly position, and they 
find the backing of Western governments useful. 
Furthermore, both the CMEA and the EC have certain 
grievances against the other side, and the increased 
dialogue between the two blocs which seems likely to 
follow mutual recognition, in particular in the context 
of the bilateral trade agreements, suggests improved 
prospects of meeting these grievances. On the one hand 
in East Europe there has been a widespread feeling that 
the EC treatment of CMEA members has been discriminatory 
when compared with that of other third countries. This 
claim is based the EC use of quantitative restrictions, 
and its application of anti-dumping machinery in trade 
with the CMEA, as well as the relegation of East 
Europeans to a low position in the hierachy of trade 
preferences. On the other hand, the EC maintains that 
because of their economic system CMEA countries often 
appear unwilling or unable to reciprocate trade 
concessions granted by the Community, and would like to 
see the East European countries making concrete 
commitments to open their markets to EC products. The 
bilateral trade agreements between the EC and individual 
East European countries are directly aimed at meeting 
these grievances. As De Clercq, the then EC Commissioner 
for external relations, commented, apart from its 
political importance, the Joint Declaration must be 
regarded as essentially a medium-term investment (32).
In the longer term the question arises as to 
whether the Joint Declaration can be regarded as the 
first step in a process of closer association, if not 
integration, with East European countries. According to 




























































































evidence for the view that the agreement marks the 
beginning of the creation of a united Europe "from the 
Atlantic to the Urals", but at times in the EC there 
does seem to have been the vision of Europe as a 
"genuinely transcontinental entity" (33).
Though it is premature to draw conclusions, 
especially as the situation is in such a state of flux, 
it does seem likely that the 1988 agreement will open 
the way for closer association with at least some the 
East European countries individually. The agreement for 
trade and cooperation with Hungary is often cited as 
evidence of this, as is the draft agreement, presented 
by the Soviet Union in Spring 1988 which is said to 
contain a proposal for free trade between the parties 
(34). However as various authors argue (Maslen (1988), 
Matejka (1988)), it is difficult not to conclude that 
differences in economic systems will prove an 
insuperable obstacle to the creation of a genuine free 
trade area.
A related question for speculation is the impact of 
the joint declaration on the CMEA. Will it lead to a 
renewal of the integration process within the CMEA (as 
happened in 1949 and 1971), or will closer links with 
West Europe encourage some of the smaller East European 
countries to relax, if not sever their bonds with the 
CMEA? It seems likely that renewed integration within 
the CMEA will be attempted, but the reforms in progess 
appear to have intensified the divergent tendancies 
within East Europe, reducing the chances of success of 
such an attempt. In Hungary the possibility of leaving 
the CMEA and switching allegiance to Brussels has 
already been voiced. Although such a move seems 
extremely unlikely, it still seems too early for 
conclusions about more moderate changes.
As a final note of warning it should be mentioned 
that old attitudes die hard. As John Maslen (1988, 
p.564) comments, some East European spokesmen still find 
it hard to believe that the EC is not directed against 
anyone, and especially in the GDR anti-EC propaganda 
continues. However these are minority opinions which run 





























































































* I would especially like to thank Mario Nuti for his 
support, encouragement and comments, and Emir Lawless 
and Silvia Paoli for all their help.
This forms part of a much longer, ongoing study of 
EC-East European economic relations. The research is 
based on the literature and on interviews with officials 
concerned with East European affairs. My thanks 
therefore go to John Maslen, Neville Williams, John 
Maddison and Franco Campoli of the EC Commission, to 
Neil Harvey of the British DTI, to Janet West and David 
Wyatt of the Export Credit Guarantee Department, and to 
the various people I spoke to at the MAFF. The usual 
disclaimer about responsibility of course applies.
1) Here only 6 of the European members of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) are 
considered, namely, the Soviet Union and five of the 
smaller East European countries (Bulgaria, 
Czechoslavakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland). The non- 
European members of the CMEA (Mongolia, Cuba and 
Vietnam) are excluded from the discussion as are those 
countries having only observer status (Angola, Laos, 
Ethiopia, and North Korea) and Yugoslavia, which only 
participates in CMEA activities with regards to certain 
sectors. In general Albania has also been left out 
because the autarchic policy pursued for many years has 
meant that trade and economic relations with the EC and 
its member states have generally been minimal.
Unless otherwise stated, the EC is taken to mean the 
original six members (Belgium, France, the FRG, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands) from 1958-73; the 
Community of 9 (with the addition of Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK) over the 1973-1980 period; of 10 (including 
Greece) from 1981-5, and of 12 (with Spain and Portugal) 
only since 1986.
2) See Marsh (1978) p.26.
3) Bel (1988), Chapman (1986), Chiusano (1985), De 
Clercq (1981)Friessen (1976), Irmer Report (1982), Marsh 
(1978), Maslen (1986), Matejka (1988), Pinder (1975), 
Riishoj (1985), Tosi (1987), Verny (1988) and Wilcznski 
(1980).
4) Lavigne (1985), Pinder (1986) etc.
5) UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/3 pp.338-9.




























































































7) See Marsh (1978) p.27
8) The EC objections are also voiced in the Irraer Report 
of the
European Parliament (1982).
9) As described in European Report n. 1137 of 5/6/1985.
10) As described in the Klepsch Report of the European 
Parliament (1974).
11) See for example Beseler and Williams (1986), Denton 
(1987), Van Bael and Beilis (1985), Vandoren (1987), and 
the annual EC Commission Reports on Anti-Dumping 
Activities.
12) In particular Denton (1987) and Patterson (1986).
13) See OJ No. C 268 of 22/11/75 pp.18-23.
14) House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee 
(1989), p. XIV.
15) The Delorozoy Report p. 15.
16) Established by a Council Decision of 27/9/1960.
17) See Council decisions of 14-15 May 1962, 26 January
1965, 25 July 1967, 73/391/EEC of December 1973 and
76/641/EEC of 27 July 1976.
18) House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee Second
Report (1989), p.xvi.
19) House of Commons op. cit. p.xvi.
20) These difficulties are described in Bertsch (1985), 
Schiavone (1985) and Woolcock (1980). According to 
Schiavone, though the compromise reached among Cocom 
members in July 1984 concerning trade in computers, 
software and telecommunications is likely to resolve 
some of the differences between the US and Western 
Europe, many perplexities will undoubtedly remain on 
both sides.
21) See Bersch (1985), Schiavone (1985) and Woolcock 
(1980).
22) John Maslen (1984) pp.340-341 describes this debate
in more detail.




























































































24) See for example Fallenbuchl (1983), Levclk and
Skolka (1984), and Zaleski and Wienert (1980).
25) These special provisions are set out in the Treaty 
of Rome and ensure that internal German trade is not 
treated like foreign trade. In practice this means that 
GDR exports to the FRG are not subject to the Community 
quota or levy system, nor to the levies on agricultural 
goods coming from third countries. For a more detailed 
account see Garland (1985) or Tirapolski and Globokar 
(1984).
26) Irmer Report of the European Parliament (1982), 
P • 15.
27) S.M. Senior Nello (1985).
28) P.l of the agreement with Hungary (EC Commission 
(88) 1332 final of 21 Sept. 1988).
29) 0J L 260/76.
30) OJ C 7/7 of 10 Jan. 1988.
31) See for example the debate on the Tzounis report on
Albania of 24 October, 1985 reported in Maslen,
1986, p.354.
32) According to Bel (1988) p.316.
33) See for example the Seeler Report of the European 
Parliament (1986, p.6) which states:
"...the partition of Europe is contrary to the 
tradition of intellectual, cultural and economic ties 
between Eastern and Western Europe and contributes to 
the polarization of world politics into a power struggle 
between the two superpowers, and the aim of our policy 
is to overcome this division of Europe..."




























































































Table 1: EC Anti-Dumping Cases Since 1985 Involving East 
European Countries
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Bulgaria - 1 - - 2 1 -
Czech. - 8 5 3 4 1 2
GDR - 6 6 2 . 3 2 3
Hungary 1 5 1 1 4 1
Poland - 6 1 1 4 1
Romania - A 3 3 2 2 1
USSR 1 
East Europe
3 3 3 4 1 1




25 48 58 38 49 36 24
East Eur.
as % all 8% 69% 33% 34% 47% 25% 29%
countries
Table 2 Anti-dumping Procedures Initiated against Imports 
East Europe since 1985 by Product
























































































































Urea Cz, GDR, USSR Undertakings
(and other 5 countries)
Ferro-silicon USSR Undertaking
1987
Urea (extension) R (of 6 countries) Undertaking
Polyester fibre R (of 5 countries)
1988
Calcium metal USSR Still investigating
Welded tubes 
(iron and steel) R
(and Yugoslavia)
Still investigating
Barium chloride GDR, CSSR Still investigating
Methenamine R, P, H, B, CSSR, 
(and Yugoslavia)
Still investigating
Source : Elaborations on the basis of information given by the 
EC Commission.
Table 3: Outcome of Anti-dumping Procedures Involving East
European Countries
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
No. undertakings 25 3 25 11 16 2 13
Imposition of 
definitive duties 4 - 3 7 - - -
Imposition of 
provisional duties 3 _ 10 10 3 1 3
No dumping - 1 1 ~ 1
No injury 5 4 8 2
Concluded for other 
reasons 3 - - - 1 - -




























































































Table 4: Value of EC Imports Subject to Anti-Dumping Measures 
In 1986
(a) (b) (c)
Country Value of imports total value of (b) as




Bulgaria 394 548,836 0.07%
CSSR 21,970 2,107,765 1.04%
GDR 8,125 1,625,728 0.50%
Hungary 10,321 1,887,964 0.50%
Poland 5,215 2,947,278 0.18%
Romania 5,670 2,482,673 0.20%
USSR 9,336 13,157,677 0.07%
Source: Vandoren (1988)
Table 5 : Trade Agreements between the EC and CMEA Members
CMEA
Partner
Product Type of Agreement Duration
Romania Industrial
products
Trade (see text) 1981-
Bulgaria Sheepmeat + goatmeat ERA-export quota 1980-
Czech. . »
GDR » Ii 1987-8
Hungary . il 1980-
Poland ii it II •I
Romania . II ii "
Hungary Young calves for 
fattening
II ll 1988
Poland " II •I "
Romania » •1 ll ■
Bulgaria textiles VER 1987-90































































































Romania • • l
Bulgaria steel
2
ERA-price monitoring system 1987-8
Czech " l il "
Hungary " VER- h
Poland • ERA- •I
Romania • I I "
Soviet Union Kraftliner 
and board





Trade and cooperation 
(see text)
1988-98
Czech. l Trade 1989- 
(see text)
Source : An updated version of GATT, Developments in the Trading 
System October 1987-March 1988, L/6366, 12 August 1988, EC 
Documentation Service Data Bank
Table 6: EC-East European Trade 
(value in million ECU)
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance
1976 12432 10920 1512
1977 13217 12359 858
1978 13418 12846 572
1979 14673 16134 -1461
1980 16374 19334 -2960
1981 17321 22257 -4936
1982 17298 26354 -9056
1983 20357 28145 -7788
1984 21323 34948 -13625
1985 22505 33122 -10617

































































































CMEA 7 CMEA 6 CMEA 7 CMEA 6
1958 12 13 11 13
1970 15 16 15 17
1980 20 20 17 19
1986 14 15 13 14
Source: Eurostat Foreign Trade Statistical Yearbook, 1987.
Notes: EC 12 countries, including intra-German trade.
CMEA 7 include: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary. 
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